A Supplemental Materials: Sample
The survey was conducted in the summer of 2014 by YouGov. Respondents from their internet panel were subsequently matched down to a sample of 2,000 based on gender, age, race, education, party identification, ideology, and political interest. The matched set of respondents was then weighted to the marginal distributions of sociodemographics in the country's total population. Weights were applied to remove remaining imbalances after the matching procedure. Table A-1 shows the distributions of the sociodemographics in the population, the weighted sample, and the raw sample.
• Interview period: June 2014
• Sample size: 2,000
• Source of data on population socio-demographics: 2010 American Community Survey, the 2010 Current Population survey and the 2007 Pew Religious Life Survey
• Weights range from 0.143 to 7.039, with a mean of 1 and a standard deviation of 1.028. Reports, 2009 Reports, (release 2011 and IRS AGI data)) and 2) the 2011 IRS marginal tax brackets.
B Supplemental Materials: Conjoint Instructions
The directions for the conjoint experiment appeared immediately before the respondent began choosing between tax plans. The exact text was:
Many observers in the United States have discussed the possibility of changing the federal income tax code to address a number of issues. We are interested in what you think about how income taxation in United States should look.
We will now provide you with several proposals for new federal income tax codes. We will always show you two possible proposals in comparison. For each comparison we would like to know which of the two tax codes you prefer. You may like both or not like either one. In any case, choose the one you prefer the most. In total, we will show you eight comparisons. All tax brackets refer to individual income. Also, all tax rates refer to marginal rates this means that all individuals only pay that rate on the portion of their income that falls into that income category.
People have different opinions about this issue and there are no right or wrong answers. Please take your time when reading the potential tax codes.
Each respondent then was presented with a table describing two plans and then asked:
Which of these plans would you rather see enacted in the United States?
• Plan A
• Plan B 2 C Supplemental Materials: Additional Survey Questions
C.1 Measurement of Racial Resentment
Table A-10 reports the subgroup results broken down by race and, for white respondents, racial resentment. This was measured using the following four questions, which were first used by Kinder and Sanders (1996) . Respondents were asked whether they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed with each of the following. The order of the questions was randomized, and only respondents who self-identified as white received these questions.
1. "Over the past few years, blacks have got less than they deserve."
2. "The Irish, Italians, Jews, Vietnamese and other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors."
3. "It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites."
4. "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class."
C.2 Measurement of direct tax ideal rates
In addition to the conjoint experiment, respondents were asked two additional questions about their income tax preferences. All respondents were asked the following question:
"Consider the taxes paid in the US by those families making more than $375,000 each year. Please select from the list below which marginal tax rate you would most like to see families making more than $375,000 each year pay."
All respondents were also asked for their ideal tax rate on an additional income group. This was randomly selected from the five other income brackets in the conjoint experiment. The question was identical to the question above, save that it replaced "more than $375,000" with one of the following: "less than $10,000"; "between $10,000 and $35,000"; "between $35,000 and $85,000"; "between $85,000 and $175,000"; or "between $175,000 and $375,000".
For both questions, the available responses were: 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%.
D Supplemental Materials: Robustness of Results
We evaluate the robustness of our primary results in a number of ways. As our survey was administered online, it is possible that respondents' attention to our questions was divided among any number of other computer tasks, and so we ran the analysis above dropping the 8.2% of the sample (164 individuals) who failed an attention check embedded in the survey (see Figure A-1) ; our primary findings are unchanged. As marginal tax rates were randomly selected for the policy pairs, one might also worry that respondents would be presented with very "strange" plans, increasing the complexity of selecting a preferred plan. To assess this possibility we identified the "easy" set of tax plans as those where marginal rates increased over the income distribution, or where decreases from one group to the next did not exceed 10%. The results are not appreciably different across plans that were "easy" or "hard" to evaluate, reducing worry that respondents were unable to form coherent preferences over tax plans with randomly generated rates (see Figure  A -2).
Another concern might be that respondents lacked a general awareness of how taxation functions, or perhaps lacked the numeracy necessary to estimate tax burdens arising under different systems; this worry is particularly poignant given Bartel's (2005) finding that more well-informed respondents were more likely to oppose the Bush-era tax cuts. All respondents answered a series of questions on general economic knowledge and numeracy; in support of Bartel's findings, we find that high levels of numeracy and economic knowledge are associated with preferences for more progressive tax policies (see Figures A-3 and A-4). However, the basic pattern of preferences for lower taxes on the poor and higher taxes on the rich remains the same for all groups.
Finally, for the main experiment, respondents were shown explicitly the estimated revenue generated by a given tax plan. This was included to force respondents to consider how plans may affect government spending options. Because the revenue attribute was not fully independently randomized, we also ran a version of the survey (N=250) that was identical to the main survey except that respondents did not see the revenue attribute. The results from this sample are reported in Figure A -5: while the small sample size means that the estimates are less precise, the point estimates are largely unchanged when compared to the version with revenue. Three tax preference types emerge from the analysis in the main text. While all types prefer low rates on those making less than $85,000 a year, we find stark differences for preferences over taxing the rich. The first group we refer to as "anti-tax." These individuals decrease their support as taxes increase for all six tax brackets; support for a tax plan peaks when tax rates are 0-5% for the poor and 15% for the rich. The second group, the "strong progressives," prefer low taxes on the poor and high taxes on the rich. For the top income groups they demonstrate increasing elasticities of support as taxes on the rich increase, with ideal rates on the top group of 45-55%. They typically also favor somewhat higher taxes on the 85-175K income bracket. Finally, we find evidence for a large third group whom we call "weak progressives." This group favors low taxes on the poor and middle incomes, and favors at least somewhat higher taxes on the rich. However, in contrast to the other two groups, these individuals are essentially indifferent between a wide range of taxes on the rich, typically 25-45%. In identifying these three types of taxation preferences, we also locate conflict over income taxation in the U.S. squarely within the domain of taxes on the rich. These three types correspond quite closely to the "steep progressives," "mild progressives," and "flatraters" described in Roberts & Hite (1994) . This similarity in our results is interesting in that is based on data collected decades apart using very different methodologies. Figure A -7 presents examples of each of these three tax preferences visually. The leftmost panel shows results for the subgroup of respondents who believe that taxes on the wealthy "harm the economy;" as can be seen, these individuals not only favor low taxes on the poor, but are some of the very few who also demonstrate negative and statistically significant elasticities of support for higher taxes on the wealthy. The middle panel presents results for respondents who identified as Democrats; unlike the average for the entire sample, Democrats clearly demonstrate strongly progressive preferences, especially for taxation on the rich. Finally, the rightmost panel presents results for individuals who believed that success was the result of "hard work" (as opposed to "luck"); as can be seen, these individuals do demonstrate generally progressive preferences, insofar as they disfavor higher taxes on the poor and do support somewhat higher taxes on the rich. However, this support for taxation on the rich is highly inelastic, with no distinguishable difference between rates of 15% to 45%, despite the enormous fiscal and redistributive consequences. Thus, we identify these types of respondents as "weak progressives." Table A Figure A-7: Three Tax Types. This plot reports corresponding to the "anti-tax," "strong progressive," and "weak progressive" types discussed above. Kinder & Sanders (1996) designed to measure racial resentment. † indicates that, in a regression that interacted "white: high resent" with each treatment dummy, the coefficient on the interaction with "white: high resent" is statistically significant at the 5% level. This table reports subgroup analysis broken down by reported frequency of church attendance. This was used to construct a binary variable for whether a respondent attended religious services at least once a week. † indicates that, in a regression that interacted "attend weekly" with each treatment dummy, the coefficient on the interaction with "attend weekly" is statistically significant at the 5% level. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are in parentheses. This table reports subgroup analysis broken down by respondents' altruism, as measured by a payoff-relevant question. Respondents were told that they would be entered into a drawing for a $100 gift card; they could choose whether to give some or all of this giftcard to a charity of their choice. Those coded as "high altruism" chose to give at least 50% of their giftcard to charity if they won. † indicates that, in a regression that interacted "high altruism" with each treatment dummy, the coefficient on the interaction with "high altruism" is statistically significant at the 5% level. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are in parentheses. Reciprocity is measured using a payoff-relevant question in which respondent must choose how much of a $100 endowment to pass to an anonymous partner; they can condition this amount based on the five $25 increments the partner could choose to send. "Freeriders" gave $0 to their partner in all cases; "Pos noncond" respondents gave the same positive amount to their partner regardless of what the partner chose; "Recip strong" and "Recip weak" refers to those whose contribution was strictly or weakly increasing in the partner's contribution, respectively. Individuals who did not fit into one of the previous categories were omitted. † indicates that, in a regression that interacted "strong reciprocity" with each treatment dummy, the coefficient on the interaction with "strong reciprocity" is statistically significant at the 5% level. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are in parentheses. 
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